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We constantlymakedecisions about how to
interpret our current situation and what to
do next. Such decisions usually reflect avail-
able sensory input and the potential costs
and benefits of choosing a particular inter-
pretation or course of action over another.
Facial expressions are a particularly infor-
mative source of sensory input. For exam-
ple, the fearful or disgusted facial expression
of a conspecific can provide information
about the presence of threat or imminent
danger of food contamination and poison-
ing. However, before we can decide on an
appropriate course of action in such a situ-
ation, we must first perceive and decide
whether the observed facial expression is
fearful or disgusted.
In a recent study published in The
Journal of Neuroscience, Thielscher and
Pessoa (2007) investigated the neural cor-
relates of perceptual decisions. They based
their study on paradigmatic neurophysio-
logical experiments with nonhuman pri-
mates (Britten et al., 1992). In those ex-
periments, monkeys observed an array of
more or less randomly moving dots and
reported with an eye movement whether
the net motion of the dots was to the left
or the right. The difficulty of the decision
depends on the proportion of dots mov-
ing in the same direction (motion coher-
ence). The activity of single neurons in
area MT reflects the degree of motion co-
herence, and the sensitivity of most neu-
rons corresponds well with the perceptual
sensitivity of the animals.
Current models of decision making,
such as the race or diffusion model, suggest
that a perceptual decision consists of three
distinct phases (Fig. 1, top). First, neurons
sensitive to motion (or facial expression)
represent the sensory input, providing evi-
dence for two alternative percepts. The evi-
dence is then integrated over time, allowing
for a more reliable comparison of the two
alternatives. In a third phase, the evidence is
compared with a criterion and, if the crite-
rion is satisfied, the behavior is initiated. To
identify neurons or structures that crucially
contribute to this decision-making process,
we need to control for their involvement in
sensory, perceptual, and motor compo-
nents (however, see Cisek, 2006).
This was one of the goals of the new
study by Thielscher and Pessoa (2007). Par-
ticipants viewed face stimuli that differed in
their emotional expression and then de-
cided with a button press whether they per-
ceived a fearful or disgusted face. Behavioral
performance followed a typical sigmoid
function with the rate of fearful responses
tracking the degree of expressed fear
[Thielscher and Pessoa (2007), their Fig. 1B
(http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/
full/27/11/2908/F1)]. The authors con-
trolled for motor components of the deci-
sion by balancing across subjects the hand
used to report the percept. They also con-
trolled for sensory components by remov-
ing discriminative sensory information
from the input. More specifically, they
presented not only fully or partially fearful
and disgusted faces but also neutral ones
(equivalent to zero motion coherence for
MT experiments). Thus, crucially, the de-
cision signal should not contain any sen-
sory information for neutral faces.
Next, Thielscher and Pessoa (2007)
calculated the probability with which the
amplitude of functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) signals in single
neutral trials predicted the subjects’ re-
port of a fearful or disgusted percept. A
network of regions predicted fearful deci-
sions in the neutral face condition, includ-
ing the superior temporal sulcus, anterior
cingulate, middle frontal gyrus, anterior
insula, inferior frontal gyrus, and orbito-
frontal cortex (Fig. 1, bottom). Relatively
fewer regions predicted disgusted deci-
sions, including the putamen, insula, and
supramarginal gyrus [Thielscher and
Pessoa (2007), their Fig. 2 (http://www.
jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/27/11/2908/
F2)]. The peak probabilities, averaged
across subjects, with which decisions
could be predicted ranged from 0.68 to
0.73, which is higher than the average
probability of many single-neuron stud-
ies. Single subjects reached probabilities
up to 0.8 [Thielscher and Pessoa (2007),
their Fig. 4 (http://www.jneurosci.org/
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cgi/content/full/27/11/2908/F4)], similar
to what single neurons can achieve (Brit-
ten et al., 1992).
A neuronal decision signal should not
only predict the behavioral decisionbut also
reflect the difficulty of the decision and the
time it takes to reach the decision.
Thielscher and Pessoa (2007) investigated
this requirement by relating reaction times
to fMRI responses. Reaction times followed
an invertedU-shape, being fastest for clearly
fearful or disgusted faces, slowest for neutral
faces and intermediate for partially fearful
or disgusted faces. This is in agreementwith
the notion of serialmodels of decisionmak-
ing that integration of evidence takes longer
when the sensory input contains little infor-
mation. Thielscher and Pessoa (2007) rea-
soned that taskdifficulty shouldhave anon-
specific effect on the reaction times,whereas
decision processes should be variable and
trial specific. Hence, a pure decision signal
should not only follow an inverted U-shape
(condition-specificmean reaction times be-
lieved to correspond to general task diffi-
culty) but also track trial-to-trial fluctua-
tions of reaction times. Within the regions
predicting perceptual choice, activity in the
anterior cingulate,middle frontal gyrus, and
inferior frontal gyrus followed such an in-
verted U-shape and also tracked trial-
to-trial reaction time (Fig. 1, bottom)
[Thielscher and Pessoa (2007), their Fig. 5
(http://www.jneurosci. org/cgi/content/
full/27/11/2908/F5)]. Note that these trial-
to-trial fluctuations could reflect the time it
takes for the evidence to reach threshold
(phase 3 of the decision process) (Fig. 1,
top).
Interestingly, the results ofprevious elec-
trophysiological studies (Britten et al., 1992;
Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen and New-
some, 2001) may imply that the distinction
between sensory, decision, and motor sys-
tems is blurred, because the same cells that
process sensory or motor information also
contain a choice-related activity compo-
nent.Accordingly,manyexisting theoretical
frameworks of perceptual decisions do not
necessarily require a pure and independent
decision process linking input with output,
because all of the computations can actually
be achieved on the sensory or motor side.
The study by Thielscher and Pessoa
(2007) somewhat challenges this implica-
tion. Their results show that higher-order
regions suchas the inferior frontal gyrusand
anterior cingulate predicted the decision
even in the absence of discriminative sen-
sory input (neutral faces) and in a task de-
sign that controlled for obvious motor out-
put differences. This suggests that these
regions dealt with genuinely choice-related
rather than sensory or motor information.
Thenature and functionof this decision sig-
nalwill need to be investigated in the future.
However, this finding is interesting because
it calls for a more explicit inclusion of a de-
cision function in models of perceptual
choices.
Several additional questions need to be
addressed in the future. Although the study
nicely disentangles sensory from perceptual
decision signals, it is more difficult (or
maybe even impossible) to separate percep-
tual from pure decision signals. Thus, it is
conceivable that participants actually per-
ceived the neutral faces as fearful or dis-
gusted. Moreover, computational models
propose an inhibitory link between the evi-
dence for the two options (Fig. 1, top). It is
unclear whether such a link exists, but the
presentdata couldperhapsbeused to search
for regions that show linear activation
changes across the spectrum of fearful to
disgusted faces, consistent with suppression
for one percept and activation with the
other. Finally, it is hard to separate decision
difficulty from perceptual uncertainty,
whichalso followsan invertedU-shape.Tri-
als in which the direction of eye gaze of the
presented face tells participants whether to
respond fearful or disgusted could help to
solve someof these issues. In such trials, par-
ticipants would follow the instruction, and
internal decision signals should occur to a
lesser degree, whereas perceptual uncer-
tainty signals should remain unchanged.
In summary, this study is noteworthy
because single-trial fMRI signals con-
tained as much information about up-
coming perceptual decisions as single
neurons in paradigmatic perceptual deci-
sion tasks. Moreover, it shows that emo-
tional stimulus material is amenable to
cognitive decision mechanisms and sug-
gests that these mechanisms might be im-
plemented similarly throughout the
brain. Finally, it suggests that perceptual
and decision signals may overlap, whereas
sensory signals appear to be processed
mostly separately (Fig. 1, bottom).
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Figure 1. Top,Model of decision process [modified fromMazurek et al. (2003)]. Bottom, Selected decision-related activations
(Thielscher andPessoa, 2007). Regions in orangepredictwhether a fearful or a disgusted facehas beenpresented. Regions in blue
predict whether the participant will choose “fearful” or “disgusted,” and regions in yellow correlate with decision as operation-
alized by trial-to-trial changes in reaction time.
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